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This article analyses three important developments in EU free 
movement law from the perspective of the structure of free movement 
law. Each of these developments – market access, horizontal direct 
effect and the assimilation of justifications – is caused by structural 
changes in the application of the free movement provisions. Firstly, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has used 'backwards 
reasoning', which means that the Court no longer maintains the 
consecutive order of the structure. Moreover, the Court has increasingly 
merged what were previously distinct stages of inquiry in free 
movement cases. The result is that the proportionality test has become 
the most likely tool to solve free movement cases. This process of 
centralisation can be explained by the Court's aim to guarantee the 
effet utile of the free movement provisions. However, the centralisation 
of proportionality has a number of important consequences. Ultimately, 
the (almost) exclusive reliance on proportionality to solve free 
movement cases does not improve the functioning of the internal 
market. Therefore, the Court should also develop and rely on the other 
pillars of the structure of free movement law. 
Keywords: Free movement law, market access, horizontal direct 
effect, justifications, proportionality 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Free movement law has been built on solid foundations. Because of the 
open-ended nature of the Treaty provisions on free movement, the 
foundations of free movement law have primarily been developed 
through the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union ('the 
Court'). They have resulted in what could be described as 'the structure 
of free movement law' – a framework of assessment that is used to 
assess free movement cases. In comparison with other sub-disciplines 
in EU law, it is this structure that makes free movement law such a 
clear and accessible subject. The structure is not only helpful to teach 
free movement law, but it is also used in practice. For example, in its 
preliminary reference in Viking,1 the English Court of Appeal asked a 
number of questions that were structured precisely in accordance with 
the structure of free movement law.2 This shows that the structure of 
free movement does not only facilitate students in studying free 
movement law, but that it is also applied by lawyers and courts in 
practice Nevertheless, free movement cases are rarely analysed from 
the perspective of their structure. Such a structural approach is 
inevitably rather technical. However, this exercise in 'dissection' shows 
how various developments in free movement law are connected and 
how they lead to the same result. The structure of free movement law is 
a technique that is used by the Court to protect the functioning of the 
internal market. Transformations in this structure show how the Court 
has changed its approach to guarantee the effet utile of the free 
movement provisions. As such, a structural approach to analysing free 
movement cases reveals the Court's vision of how free movement 
should be protected in the internal market. 
The structure of free movement law has four different pillars. These 
pillars constitute four separate stages of inquiry. Furthermore, they are 
consecutive and cumulative. Therefore, a party can only successfully 
establish a breach of the free movement provisions if each of the four 
                                            
1 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish 
Seamen's Union v Viking Line ABP, EU:C:2007:772. 
2 Ibid, para 27. 
4 
 
stages is passed. First of all, cases have to come within the scope of 
the free movement provisions. This normally means that cases must 
have a cross-border element. Secondly, the free movement provisions 
have to be directly effective – a party who is claiming that their free 
movement rights have been breached has to be able to rely on the free 
movement provisions against the defendant. The third step is to see if 
there has been a restriction on free movement. Fourthly, a restriction 
can still be justified by reference to one of the express derogations in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') or one of 
the public interest requirements developed in the case law of the Court. 
Before measures are justified, it has to be shown that they comply with 
the principle of proportionality. It is within this structure that free 
movement cases are solved. 
The starting point of this article is that developments in the Court's case 
law make it necessary to rethink the structure of free movement law. 
The argument is based on two observations. Firstly, there is an 
increasing amount of interaction between what were previously distinct 
stages of inquiry in free movement cases. Secondly, the consecutive 
order of the structure of free movement law is no longer maintained. 
The result is that the assessment of the existence of a restriction has 
an impact on the question of whether a case comes within the scope of 
free movement law in the first place. Similarly, the question whether 
there is a restriction on free movement might determine whether the 
free movement provisions have direct effect. The Court has 
increasingly applied this 'backwards' reasoning, which challenges the 
consecutive order of the structure. As a consequence, the four pillars of 
the structure of free movement law have become more merged.  
This process of interaction will be analysed to explain three important 
developments in free movement law. These developments – or 
transformations – have been discussed extensively over the last 
decade or so.3 However, an analysis from the perspective of the 
                                            
3 See, for example, on market access: Jukka Snell, 'The Notion of Market 
Access: a Concept or a Slogan?' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 437; 
Gareth Davies, 'Understanding Market Access: Exploring the Economic 
Rationality of Different Conceptions of Free Movement Law' (2010) 11 
German Law Journal 671; Max Jansson and Harri Kalimo, 'De Minimis Meets 
“Market Access”: Transformations in the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU 
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structure of free movement law is able to show that the three 
developments are in fact interconnected and, moreover, that they lead 
to the same result. Firstly, the interaction between scope and restriction 
has resulted in a market-access approach in free movement law. 
Secondly, the interaction between direct effect and restriction has 
brought about an increasing number of cases in which the free 
movement provisions were held to have horizontal direct effect. Thirdly, 
the interaction between restriction and justification has resulted in the 
assimilation of the express derogations in the Treaty and the public 
interest justifications developed in the Court's case law. As a 
consequence, the nature of a restriction is no longer relevant for the 
kind of justifications defendants in free movement cases can rely on. 
The next step is to show that all three developments lead to the same 
result: they make the proportionality test the most likely tool to solve 
free movement cases. The Court is increasingly confident to make the 
proportionality test decisive. The underlying reason for this 
development is that the Court believes that the proportionality test is 
the most suitable tool to guarantee the effective application of the free 
movement provisions. This process of centralisation of proportionality 
has important consequences, which will be analysed in the final part of 
the article. The focus will not be on the substance of the proportionality 
test,4 but rather on the role that proportionality plays in the re-thought 
structure of free movement law. It will be argued that there is a risk in 
relying too much on proportionality to determine the outcome of free 
movement cases. The Court should not be afraid to explore its 
                                                                                                                       
Free Movement Law?' (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 523; on 
horizontal direct effect: Julio Bacquero Cruz, 'Free movement and Private 
Autonomy' (1999) 24 European Law Review 603; Christoph Krenn, 'A Missing 
Piece in the Horizontal Effect 'Jigsaw': Horizontal Direct Effect and the Free 
Movement of Goods' (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 177; on the 
(potential) assimilation of justifications: Eleanor Spaventa, 'On Discrimination 
and the Theory of Mandatory Requirements' (2002) 3 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 45; Laurence Gormley, 'Inconsistencies and 
Misconceptions in the Free Movement of Goods' (2015) 40 European Law 
Review 925. More precise references can be found below. 
4 See Takis Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press 
2006), Chapter 5; Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in 
European Law (Kluwer 1996). 
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complete free movement toolbox and should also rely on other tools in 
the structure of free movement law (such as scope, direct effect and 
justification) to solve free movement cases. This variation in case-
solving strategies will ultimately improve the functioning of the internal 
market.  
II. THE STRUCTURE OF FREE MOVEMENT LAW 
Before the processes of interaction in the structure of free movement 
law can be analysed, it is necessary to set out the structure of free 
movement law as it has been developed by the Court. The approach 
will be horizontal across the various freedoms, although particular 
features of certain free movement provisions will be highlighted.  
First of all, the free movement provisions are only applicable if cases 
come within their scope. The Court has developed three main 
mechanisms to find that cases fall outside the scope of the free 
movement provisions. The first is the 'wholly internal situation' rule.5 
The free movement provisions do not apply to situations that are 
internal to one Member State. If all aspects of a case relate to domestic 
matters, the cross-border element, which is necessary to justify the 
application of the free movement provisions, is missing. This approach 
has been used primarily for cases concerning the free movement of 
persons.6 Secondly, the free movement provisions do not apply to 
national rules if their effect on free movement is 'too indirect and 
                                            
5 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013), Chapter 4. See also Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 'Free 
Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?' (2002) 
39 Common Market Law Review 741; Camille Dautricourt and Sébastien 
Thomas, 'Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons under 
Community Law: All for Ulysses, Nothing for Penelope?' (2009) 34 European 
Law Review 433. The rationale of the rule was strongly criticised by Advocate 
General Sharpston in her Opinion in Case C-212/06 Government of the 
French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government, 
EU:C:2007:398. 
6 Case C-175/78 The Queen v Saunders, EU:C:1979:88; Case C-299/95 
Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich, EU:C:1997:254. See Síofra 
O'Leary, 'The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law' 
(2009) Irish Jurist 13. 
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uncertain'.7 This is another way of saying that cases lack a sufficient 
cross-border element for the free movement provisions to be 
applicable.8 Because the focus is on the effect of a national rule, it 
could be argued that this approach already combines the concepts of 
scope and restriction.9However, it is clear that this approach focusses 
on the scope of the free movement provisions. The best way to show 
this is to analyse the third mechanism which the Court has developed 
only for goods. This mechanism is the so-called Keck proviso.10 Rules 
which affect the circumstances under which products can be sold fall 
outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU, as long as they apply to all 
relevant traders and do not discriminate in law or in fact against 
products coming from another Member State.11 If the Keck proviso is 
fulfilled, a case falls outside Article 34 TFEU because the effect on 
cross-border trade is too indirect or uncertain.12 Because there is no de 
minimis rule for goods, such cases fall outside the scope of Article 34 
TFEU altogether. Therefore, relying on the concept of remoteness is 
another way of saying that cases fall outside the scope of the free 
movement provisions.13 This confirms that national rules whose effect 
on free movement is 'too indirect and uncertain' also fall outside the 
scope of the free movement provisions.14  
                                            
7 Eleanor Spaventa, 'From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non)Economic 
European Constitution' (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 743. See also 
Eleanor Spaventa, 'The Outer Limits of the Free Movement of Persons: Some 
Reflections on the Significance of Keck, Remoteness and Deliège', in 
Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of 
European Union Law (Hart Publishing 2008) 245-272. 
8 Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and 
Netherlands State, EU:C:1990:97 (goods) and Case C-190/98 Volker Graf v 
Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, EU:C:2000:49 (workers).  
9 See Nic Shuibhne (n 5) Chapter 4. See also Catherine Barnard, 'Fitting the 
Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw?' (2001) 26 European 
Law Review 35, 52. 
10 Case C-267/91 Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard, EU:C:1993:905. 
11 Ibid, para 16. 
12 Ibid, para 17. 
13 Gormley (n 3) 925, 936. 
14 Thomas Horsley, 'Unearthing Buried Treasure: Art. 34 TFEU and the 
Exclusionary Rules' (2012) 37 European Law Review 734, 741. 
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If a case falls within the scope of the free movement provisions, the 
next step is to determine if the free movement provisions can be relied 
on against the defendant. In other words, are the free movement 
provisions directly effective against the defendant? The orthodox 
approach of the Court has been to hold that the free movement 
provisions have vertical direct effect and can be relied on against the 
State. However, they do not have horizontal direct effect. As a result, 
private parties are in principle not directly bound by the free movement 
provisions. This can most clearly be seen for goods, where the Court 
has always held that States are bound by the free movement 
provisions, while the conduct of private parties should be assessed 
under the competition law provisions. This statement does not 
adequately reflect the way the case law on direct effect has developed 
for the other freedoms. From early on in its case law, the Court has 
extended the application of the free movement provisions to private 
parties who were engaged in collective regulation and who exercised 
legal autonomy.15 Through this approach the free movement provisions 
have been applied to organisations such as the UCI and the UEFA.16 
However, the Court has never explained what is meant by 'collective 
regulation' and 'legal autonomy'. Finally, there are some examples 
where the Court held that the free movement provisions were 
applicable to private parties in a purely horizontal situation even without 
a collective element. The best example is Angonese,17 in which Article 
45 TFEU was applied to a horizontal dispute between a job applicant 
and a private employer. As a result, Article 45 TFEU has horizontal 
direct effect in employment situations,18 while Article 34 TFEU remains 
a 'fortress' of vertical direct effect only.19  
                                            
15 Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch v Union cycliste internationale, 
EU:C:1974:140.  
16 Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch (UCI), and Case C-415/93 Union royale 
belge des societés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, 
EU:C:1995:463 (UEFA). 
17 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 
EU:C:2000:296. 
18 Alan Dashwood, 'Viking and Laval: Issues of Horizontal Direct Effect' (2008) 
10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 525. 
19 Krenn (n 3). 
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Thirdly, the Court proceeds with the question of whether free 
movement has been restricted. Is there a prima facie breach which has 
to be justified by the Member State? Again, three main approaches to 
identify a restriction can be distinguished. First, the Court has used a 
discrimination test. This test is primarily used for persons – also 
because discrimination is explicitly referred to in Article 45 TFEU.20 
Both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited. Direct 
discrimination means that there is a difference in treatment between 
national workers and non-national workers.21 The discrimination is 
visible in how the rule has been formulated – as such, it is often called 
discrimination in law. With indirect discrimination, the formulation of the 
rule is neutral and does not appear to make a distinction between 
national workers and non-national workers. However, the effect of the 
rule is such that it is more difficult for non-national workers to comply 
with it.22 This is called discrimination in fact. For goods, the Court does 
not use an approach based on discrimination. It uses the concepts of 
distinct and indistinct applicability. However,, in essence, these 
concepts are the equivalent of direct and indirect discrimination for 
goods. A second approach which has been developed by the Court to 
identify a restriction is the so-called obstacle approach. Obstacles are 
national rules that make the exercise of free movement rights more 
difficult or less attractive. It is not strictly necessary to establish 
discrimination – in fact, the obstacle approach is also applied to 
genuinely non-discriminatory national rules.23 However, because the 
test does not require an assessment of whether there is discrimination, 
it is also possible that discriminatory rules are classified as obstacles. 
In the analysis below, it will be shown that this has an impact on the 
interaction between restriction and justification. The application of the 
obstacle test is quite flexible and it is relatively easy to establish a 
restriction.24 Thirdly, a restriction on the free movement of goods can be 
                                            
20 In Bosman (n 16), the Court held that non-discriminatory obstacles to free 
movement of persons were also a restriction of Article 45 TFEU. 
21 See Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (4th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 279. 
22 See, for example, Case C-379/87 Anita Groener v Minister of Education, 
EU:C:1989:599. 
23 Case C-415/93 Bosman (n 16). 
24 Barnard (n 21) 281-282. 
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established through the Keck proviso. Selling arrangements fall outside 
the scope of Article 34 TFEU as long as they apply to all relevant 
traders and they affect domestic and foreign products in the same 
manner. Therefore, Keck appears to rely on a discrimination test to 
bring national rules on selling arrangements back in the scope of Article 
34 TFEU on the basis of the existence of a restriction. This is a good 
example of 'backwards' reasoning by the Court. The identification of a 
restriction brings the case back in the scope of free movement law. The 
next section will analyse how this interaction has resulted in the 
development of a market access approach. 
Fourthly, once a restriction on free movement has been established, 
the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that this restriction can 
be justified. The justification stage consists of two steps: first, the 
defendant has to show that there is a ground of justification. Second, 
the measure has to be proportionate. The proportionality test assesses 
whether the measure is suitable and necessary.25 The suitability test 
assesses the connection between the tool chosen and the aim to be 
achieved – the ground of justification. Is the measure taken suitable to 
achieve this aim? The necessity test focusses on the question whether 
any alternative measures could have been adopted that would have 
been less restrictive of free movement. As regards the grounds of 
justification that can be relied on, for each free movement provision a 
corresponding list of justifications has been included in the TFEU. 
These justifications are called express derogations. Because of the 
exhaustive nature of the Treaty derogations, and the fact that most of 
them were already included in the Treaties in the 1950s, the Court has 
developed a second case law-based category of justifications that can 
be used to justify restrictions on free movement. In Cassis de Dijon,26 
the Court held that indistinctly applicable restrictions on free movement 
of goods could also be justified on the basis of so-called 'mandatory 
requirements'.27 They are a non-exhaustive list of good reasons that 
                                            
25 See Takis Tridimas, 'Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the 
Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny', in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing 1999). 
26 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
('Cassis de Dijon'), EU:C:1979:42. 
27 Ibid, para 8. 
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Member States – or private parties – can rely on to justify restrictions 
on free movement. It is always open to a Member State to claim that a 
particular policy consideration constitutes a mandatory requirement. 
However, it is ultimately for the Court to assess whether a mandatory 
requirement should be accepted under EU law. The most commonly 
relied on mandatory requirements are consumer protection and 
environmental protection. This category of justifications has now also 
been extended to the other freedoms, where mandatory requirements 
are referred to as public interest requirements or objective justifications. 
The basic rule remains that these justifications can only be used to 
justify restrictions that are indirectly discriminatory, indistinctly 
applicable or obstacles. Rules that make a direct distinction between 
domestic and foreign products, or rules that discriminate directly on the 
ground of nationality, cannot be justified by mandatory requirements. 
The Treaty derogations are the only justifications that can be relied on 
to justify such restrictions. The distinction becomes more difficult to 
maintain if directly discriminatory rules are classified as obstacles by 
the Court. This could lead to interaction between restriction and 
justification. This process of interaction will be analysed below. 
III. THREE DEVELOPMENTS IN FREE MOVEMENT LAW 
1. Market Access: Interaction between Scope and Restriction 
In this section, three developments will be analysed to illustrate the 
changes that have taken place in the structure of free movement law. 
Again, the approach will be horizontal. Nevertheless, to be able to 
make a convincing case that these transformations have taken place 
across all freedoms, for each section at least two cases that concerned 
different freedoms will be discussed. 
In the last two decades, the Court has increasingly made use of a 
market access test to identify restrictions on free movement. The 
concept of market access is not entirely new to EU law, since it has 
already been used in competition law.28 In free movement cases, the 
Court appears to use the market access test to establish restrictions on 
the free movement provisions – national rules that prevent or hinder 
                                            
28 Snell (n 3) 438-440. 
12 
 
market access are considered to restrict free movement. However, 
market access is more than just the identification of a restriction. It has 
become a concept through which the Court is able to combine the issue 
of the scope of free movement law with the issue of a restriction on free 
movement. Therefore, market access is not solely about a restriction, 
but also incorporates the determination of whether a case falls within 
the scope of free movement law. This determination is based on the 
identification of a restriction on market access. As such, market access 
is an example of a tool whereby the Court uses 'backwards' reasoning 
– the Court starts with the identification of a restriction and uses its 
finding on that issue to bring a case within the scope of free movement 
law. The problem with this market access approach is that it has been 
applied in such a way that it does not only apply 'backwards' reasoning 
from restriction to scope, but that it also fuses the two concepts in such 
a way that they can no longer be distinguished. The result of this 
process of (con)fusion is that the Court's reasoning has become less 
clear and less predictable.29 
The 'father' – or 'mother' – of the market access test is the Court's 
judgment in Keck. This might come as a surprise to some, because 
Keck is generally considered as a case that attempted to limit the 
scope of application of Article 34 TFEU. The Court tried to do this by 
creating a new category of national rules – selling arrangements – that 
fell outside Article 34 TFEU. However, Keck was a balancing exercise 
between two different interests. On the one hand, the Court wanted to 
take into account the concerns of the Member States that were worried 
about the increasing number of national rules which were challenged 
under the free movement provisions. On the other hand, the Court did 
not want to create a regulatory safe zone for Member States, in which 
they could adopt rules that could not be reviewed by the Court. The 
result was a compromise that led to the Keck proviso. Selling 
arrangements are outside Article 34 TFEU if they apply to all relevant 
traders and if they affect domestic and foreign products in the same 
manner.  
The Keck proviso already represented a new kind of interaction 
between scope and restriction: the identification of disparate treatment 
                                            
29 Snell (n 28) 470; Jansson and Kalimo (n 3) 557. 
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would bring a case into the scope of Article 34 TFEU. As such, the 
Keck proviso for the first time established a test that went from 
restriction to scope. This is an example of the Court's 'backwards' 
reasoning. Nevertheless, in Keck, the two were still regarded as 
separate concepts – only if there is disparate treatment are selling 
arrangements brought back in the scope of Article 34 TFEU. There has 
always been discussion about the precise nature of the second Keck 
proviso.30 In theory, the test requires the claimant to show that a selling 
arrangement has a negative effect on foreign products, and that there 
is indirect discrimination. However, in practice, the second proviso has 
been applied as a market access test by the Court.31 This can clearly 
be seen in De Agostini,32 which concerned a Swedish prohibition of 
advertisements aimed at children under the age of 12. An Italian 
publisher of children magazines about dinosaurs was prevented from 
showing commercials aimed at young children on Swedish television. 
This was a selling arrangement that complied with the first Keck 
proviso, as Swedish magazines could not show commercials aimed at 
young children either. It was less clear whether the prohibition on 
advertising also complied with the second proviso. De Agostini claimed 
that 'television advertising was the only effective form of promotion 
enabling it to penetrate the Swedish market'.33 The Court held that, if 
this were true, the prohibition would not affect domestic and foreign 
products in the same manner, and there would be a restriction of Article 
34 TFEU. This assessment had to be made by the national court on the 
basis of the evidence provided to it.34 As a consequence, market 
access has become a criterion for the Keck proviso, but whether 
market access is restricted remains a factual assessment to be made 
                                            
30 Daniel Wilsher, 'Does Keck Discrimination Make Any Sense? An Assessment 
of the Non-Discrimination Principle within the European Single Market' (2008) 
33 European Law Review 3; Stefan Enchelmaier, 'The Awkward Selling of a 
Good Idea, or a Traditionalist Interpretation of Keck' (2003) 3 Yearbook of 
European Law 249; Stephen Weatherill, 'After Keck: Some Thought on How to 
Clarify the Clarification' (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 885. 
31 Barnard (n 9) 44. 
32 Case C-9/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini, EU:C:1997:344. 
33 Ibid, para 43. 
34 Ibid, paras 44-45. 
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by the national court. Furthermore, the two concepts of scope and 
restriction remain separate. 
Market access has moved on since then. In Commission v Italy 
(Trailers)35 and Mickelsson and Roos,36 the Court for the first time 
introduced market access as a self-standing test to establish a 
restriction of Article 34 TFEU.37 It did so in the context of so-called bans 
or restrictions on use – national rules that did not ban the import of 
certain products, but that banned or restricted their use. Again, the 
Court reasoned from restriction to scope. However, the way this was 
done differed from the approach under the Keck proviso, since there 
was no clear distinction anymore between the two stages of inquiry.  
Mickelsson and Roos concerned a Swedish ban on using jet skis. They 
could only be used on general waterways and on waters that had 
specifically been allocated by the Swedish authorities. At the time of the 
case, no waters had in fact been allocated. Therefore, it was very 
difficult to use jet skis in Sweden. The claimants argued that this ban 
constituted a restriction on the free movement of goods. The Court 
agreed. It held that this ban had 'a considerable influence on the 
behaviour of consumers'.38 This may 'affect the access of that product 
to the market of that Member State'.39 The Court accepted that the 
question of whether the Swedish rule had a disparate impact on foreign 
products should be answered by the national court. However, it held 
that rules which ban or greatly restrict the use of certain products have 
the effect of hindering access to the market and constitute a restriction 
on the free movement of goods.  
Interestingly, while the Court left the assessment of whether a national 
rule banned or greatly restricted use to the national court, it 
automatically followed from such a finding that the rule hindered market 
access. This automatic link merges the concepts of scope and 
                                            
35 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italian Republic, EU:C:2009:66. 
36 Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos, 
EU:C:2009:336. 
37 See also Eleanor Spaventa, 'Leaving Keck behind? The Free Movement of 
Goods after the Rulings in Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos' 
(2009) 34 European Law Review 914. 
38 Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, para 26. 
39 Ibid. 
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restriction. With the Keck proviso, it is the finding of a restriction that 
brings a case back in the scope of free movement law, but with this 
market access approach it is the presumption of a restriction on the 
basis of which a case is held to come within the scope of free 
movement law. The market access test is applied in abstracto.40 The 
Court did not investigate where the jet skis in this case had been 
produced. The Court did not investigate the number of imports of jet 
skis into Sweden. Mickelsson and Roos were both Swedish citizens 
who had used their jet skis on Swedish waters. As a result, the cross-
border element was based on the abstract finding of a restriction on 
market access of parties that were not involved in the case. No 
assessment had to be conducted by the national court. The result is 
that market access has simply become a technique – or slogan41 – to 
fuse the concepts of scope and restriction in such a way that Member 
States are put in a position where they have to justify restrictions on 
free movement. 
The argument that market access is a technique rather than a test 
based on an economic or market assessment can most convincingly be 
made by making a link to the other freedoms. Carpenter42 is often 
referred to. This case concerned an English service provider who 
claimed that his right to provide services in other Member States would 
be restricted if his wife, who was not an EU citizen, were deported to 
her home country. Again, the Court used an abstract finding of a 
restriction – the possibility that Mr Carpenter would have to travel to 
other Member States to provide services there – to bring the case 
within the scope of the free movement provisions. Although the 
language of market access was not used, the technique adopted by the 
Court was essentially similar.  
This technique has even found its way into the Court's case law on 
citizenship. Ruiz Zambrano43 constitutes the 'citizenship equivalent' of 
market access. A Colombian family was at risk of being deported from 
                                            
40 Davies (n 3). 
41 Snell (n 28). 
42 Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
EU:C:2002:434. 
43 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi, 
EU:C:2011:124. 
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Belgium. The two children had been born in Belgium and had Belgian 
nationality. They had never left the Belgian territory. The result was that 
it was difficult for the family to claim that their case came within the 
scope of free movement law, since there was no cross-border element. 
The Court managed to find a way around this by focussing on the 
'genuine enjoyment of the substance'44 of the children's free movement 
rights under Article 20 TFEU. If the family were deported from Belgium, 
the children would not be able to exercise their free movement rights to 
move freely between EU Member States. This would deprive them of 
the genuine enjoyment of their rights.  
Although Carpenter and Ruiz Zambrano were strongly influenced by 
the Court's aim to protect the right to family life,45 the technique used in 
both cases is similar to the market access test. In both cases, the Court 
reasoned from restriction to scope, and there was no clear distinction 
between the two steps. The burden of proof then shifted to the Member 
State to show that the restrictions could be justified and were 
proportionate. 
2. Horizontal Direct Effect: Interaction between Direct Effect and 
Restriction 
In the last decades, the free movement provisions have increasingly 
been applied to the actions of private parties. While there has never 
been much doubt that the free movement provisions had vertical direct 
effect, the extent to which private parties were also bound by them has 
been a topic of significant debate.46 Already in 1974, the Court held in 
Walrave and Koch that the free movement provisions did not only apply 
                                            
44 Ibid, para 42. 
45 Spaventa, 'From Gebhard to Carpenter' (n 7) 767-768. 
46 See Bacquero Cruz (n 3); Krenn (n 3); Mirjam De Mol, 'The Novel Approach of 
the CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-
Discrimination' (2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 109; Eva Lohse, 'Fundamental Freedoms and Private Actors – towards 
an 'Indirect Horizontal Effect' (2007) 13 European Public Law 159; Gareth 
Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract' 
(2012) 3 European Review of Private Law 805; Jukka Snell, 'Private Parties 
and the Free Movement of Goods and Services' in Mads Andenas and Wulf-
Henning Roth (eds), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford 
University Press 2002). 
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to State measures, but that they also applied to actions of private 
parties that were 'aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful 
employment and the provision of services'.47 The Court based this on 
the need to preserve the effective and uniform application of the free 
movement provisions.48 In some Member States certain activities were 
regulated by public authorities, while in other Member States these 
activities were regulated by private parties.49 The actions of both public 
and private parties had to be open to review under free movement law 
to ensure that the free movement provisions were applied effectively 
and uniformly.  
In Walrave and Koch, it appears that two criteria were used to 
determine whether the actions of a private party could be reviewed 
under free movement law. First of all, the actions had to regulate 
employment or services in a collective manner. Secondly, the obstacles 
to free movement had to result from 'the exercise of legal autonomy' of 
private parties. Presumably, this meant that the private party had to 
enjoy a position of independence from other institutions – in particular, 
from the State.  
The two criteria in Walrave and Koch were never meant to be 
formalistic – they were always supposed to be functional. The problem 
with the criteria is that the Court has never defined what it means by 
'collective regulation' and 'legal autonomy'. The Walrave and Koch 
formula is used to justify the application of the free movement to private 
parties without any attempt by the Court to show that these private 
parties are involved in collective regulation and that they exercise legal 
autonomy.50 The criteria are no more than an empty slogan that is used 
to justify horizontal direct effect. As a result, it is unclear precisely how 
the criteria should be interpreted. How broad should the scope of the 
actions of private parties be for their actions to be regarded as 
                                            
47 Ibid, paras 17-18. 
48 Stefaan van den Bogaert, 'Horizontality: The Court Attacks?' in Catherine 
Barnard and Joanne Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: 
Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing 2002), 123-152. 
49 Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch (n 48), para 19. 
50 Barend van Leeuwen, 'Private Regulation and Public Responsibility in the 
Internal Market' (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 277, 282. 
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'collective regulation'?51 If a private party is exercising regulatory power 
on the basis of State legislation that defines its powers and scope of 
action, does this private party enjoy 'legal autonomy'? These are all 
important questions that should be relevant to deciding whether the 
free movement provisions can be applied to horizontal disputes. The 
Court, however, has consistently ignored them. Rather, it has adopted 
an approach based on the impact or effect of the actions of private 
parties on the exercise of free movement right by other private 
parties.52 
This approach, based on an assessment of the effect of private parties' 
actions on the internal market, involves a similar kind of 'backwards' 
reasoning that was identified in the market access approach. It starts 
with the identification of a restriction, which is then used to justify the 
direct effect of the free movement provisions. There is no independent 
assessment of the direct effect issue – the impact of private action 
determines whether the free movement provisions are applicable.  
This approach can most clearly be seen in Fra.bo.53 Fra.bo was an 
Italian manufacturer of copper fittings that connected different pieces of 
water or gas piping. They wanted to place their products on the 
German market. The relevant German legislation on copper fittings 
required that the products be certified. Although they were not formally 
mentioned in the applicable legislation, the only body that offered this 
kind of certification was the Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches ('DVGW'). Although Fra.bo's products were initially 
certified by DVGW, the certification was later withdrawn on the basis 
that Fra.bo did not comply with some of the requirements laid down in 
                                            
51 Catherine Barnard, 'Viking and Laval: An Introduction' (2008) 10 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 462, 473; Anne CL Davies, 'One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ' (2008) 37 
Industrial Law Journal 26, 136. 
52 Harm Schepel, 'Constitutionalising the Market, Marketising the Constitution, 
and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement 
Provisions in EU Law' (2012) 18 European Law Journal 177. See also 
Laurence Gormley, 'Private Parties and the Free Movement of Goods: 
Responsible, Irresponsible, or a Lack of Principles?' (2015) 38 Fordham 
International Law Journal 993. 
53 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches eV, EU:C:2012:453. 
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the technical standard that was used for certification by DVGW. Fra.bo 
wanted to challenge this standard under Article 34 TFEU. However, 
before they could do this, they had to show that Article 34 TFEU was 
directly effective against DVGW – in other words, that the certification 
activities of DVGW could be reviewed under Article 34 TFEU. A 
preliminary reference was made to the Court with the main question 
whether DVGW was bound by Article 34 TFEU in the exercise of its 
certification activities. The Court provided a positive reply to this 
question. The structure of its judgment clearly reveals the interaction 
between direct effect and restriction. The Court held that it had to be 
determined whether 'the activities of a private-law body such as the 
DVGW [have] the effect of giving rise to restrictions on the free 
movement of goods in the same manner as do measures imposed by 
the State'.54 This statement makes it very clear that the question of 
direct effect has become dependent on the finding of a restriction. 
Article 34 TFEU was given direct effect because of the existence of a 
restriction.55 Therefore, the two stages of direct effect and restriction 
have become merged. The result is again that DVGW was put in a 
position where it had to justify the restriction on Fra.bo's right to free 
movement of goods.  
A similar approach can be seen in the Court's case law on the other 
freedoms. Two prominent examples are Viking56 and Laval.57 In these 
cases, Article 49 TFEU and Article 56 TFEU were applied to the 
activities of trade unions. In Laval, which concerned the right of a 
Latvian company to provide services in Sweden, the Court simply 
repeated the Walrave and Koch formula without investigating whether 
the trade unions in this case actually fulfilled the criteria.58 As such, the 
Court did not investigate the role that the Swedish legislative framework 
played in the facilitation of the trade union's actions. Similarly, it did not 
                                            
54 Ibid, para 26. 
55 Barend van Leeuwen, 'From Status to Impact, and the Role of National 
Legislation: The Application of Article 34 TFEU to a Private Certification 
Organisation in Fra.bo' (2013) 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation 405, 
407. See also van Leeuwen (n 51) 283.  
56 Case C-438/05 Viking (n 1). 
57 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
EU:C:2007:809. 
58 Ibid, para 98. 
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analyse the complicated process of interaction between the Swedish 
State and the trade unions in the regulation of the labour market.59 
Article 56 TFEU was applied horizontally against the trade unions on 
the basis of the impact of their actions. The blockade created by the 
trade unions had made it impossible for Laval to provide services in 
Sweden.  
In Viking, a Finnish ferry operator wanted to re-locate one of its ferries 
from Finland to Estonia. This would result in lower wages for the 
employees. Again, local trade unions – in co-operation with 
international trade unions – managed to prevent Viking from exercising 
its free movement rights. In Viking, the Court actually made an effort to 
apply the Walrave and Koch criteria to the case. First, the Court held 
that the actions of the trade unions were 'aimed at the conclusion of an 
agreement which is meant to regulate the work of Viking's employees 
collectively'.60 Second, although the trade unions were not public 
authorities, they 'exercise the legal autonomy conferred on them, inter 
alia, by national law'.61 Nevertheless, the Court again integrated the 
concept of restriction into the direct effect analysis, when it stated that it 
did not matter that 'the restriction at issue in the proceedings before the 
national court stems from the exercise of a right conferred by Finnish 
national law, such as, in this case, the right to take collective action, 
including the right to strike'.62  
Overall, in both cases, the Court was heavily influenced by the 
significant impact the actions of trade unions had had on the exercise 
of free movement rights by other private parties. The Court did not 
investigate whether it was legitimate to expect trade unions to comply 
with the free movement provisions in light of their role in the legislative 
framework which had been created by the Member States in which they 
were operating.  
                                            
59 Barend van Leeuwen, 'An Illusion of Protection and an Assumption of 
Responsibility: The Possibility of Swedish State Liability after Laval' (2012) 14 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 453. 
60 Case C-438/05 Viking (n 1), para 60. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, para 63. 
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The result of this process of 'backwards' reasoning is that the concepts 
of direct effect and restriction have merged to such an extent that a 
finding of direct effect in horizontal situations automatically means that 
there is also a restriction. Again, this means that private parties will be 
required to justify the restriction and to show that it is proportionate. 
The broader consequence is that discussions about horizontal direct 
effect are no longer about the question of what sort of organisations or 
entities should be bound by the free movement provisions. The main 
focus has now shifted to the question of what impact is required for the 
free movement provisions to be applicable. The risk of such an 
approach is that private parties who are able to restrict free movement 
rights of other parties can be held accountable under free movement 
law. This includes the possibility of private liability for breaches of the 
free movement provisions. However, it is uncertain whether the 
imposition of liability on private parties is justified solely on the basis of 
an assessment of the impact of their actions.63 It might be necessary to 
investigate more closely the context and the regulatory framework in 
which private action takes place. With an effects-based approach to 
direct effect, this important context is missing in the analysis. 
3. Assimilation of Justifications: Interaction between Restriction and 
Justification 
The third process of interaction that will be analysed is the assimilation 
of Treaty and case law-based justifications. It will be shown that this 
involves a similar kind of backwards reasoning and merging of two 
stages of inquiry. Moreover, this process leads directly to the result that 
the outcome of cases is determined by the proportionality test.  
In Cassis de Dijon, the Court held that indistinctly applicable measures 
could not only be justified by Treaty justifications, but also by 
mandatory requirements such as consumer protection or environmental 
protection.64 It was based on the Court's recognition that the 
justifications listed in the Treaty were relatively limited and, moreover, 
that they did not reflect the current social and technological reality. The 
Court held that this could force Member States to take measures for 
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reasons that were not anticipated at the time when the justifications 
were originally included in the Treaty. Furthermore, it reflects the idea 
that the internal market is about more than just market integration, and 
that it also respects non-economic values that are of importance not 
only to the Member States, but also to the EU. As a result, mandatory 
requirements provided a new source of justifications to Member 
States.65 From the perspective of the Member States, the advantage of 
this source is that it is open-ended. In principle, it is always possible for 
a Member State to rely on a particular reason to restrict free movement. 
Through the case law it is possible to make a long list with very diverse 
mandatory requirements that have been accepted by the Court.66 At the 
same time, the Court has always limited the kind of measures that 
could be justified by mandatory requirements – they could only justify 
indistinctly applicable or indirectly discriminatory measures. This is 
because distinctly applicable measures are considered to restrict free 
movement in the most serious way.  
From early on, this rule has resulted in a tension between 'good 
reasons' and 'bad measures'. Even distinctly applicable measures are 
sometimes adopted for good reasons that have not been included in 
the Treaty. As a consequence, the Court has been confronted with a 
number of cases in which pressure was exercised by the Member State 
to accept that 'bad measures' had been adopted for good reasons. The 
Court has never expressly departed from the orthodox rule, but it has 
rather attempted to maintain 'a fiction of orthodoxy'. In doing so, the 
Court has reverted to a technique which is similar to the one it has used 
in market access and horizontal direct effect cases. It has reasoned 
backwards from justification to restriction. The two separate stages of 
inquiry have been merged with a view to provide the Member State the 
opportunity to justify the measure and to proceed to the proportionality 
test. In all cases, the process of merging the restriction and justification 
analysis necessarily meant that Member States were given the chance 
to show that their measures were proportionate. If this technique had 
not been used, the ground of justification would not have been 
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the WTO' in Barnard and Scott (n 49) 269. 
66 See Barnard (n 21) 172-173. 
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accepted and the Court would not even have reached the 
proportionality stage. 
One of the clearest examples of this technique is PreussenElektra.67 In 
his Opinion, Advocate General Jacobs claimed that the classification of 
the restriction was separate from the assessment of the justification.68 
He used this to argue in favour of an approach whereby the Court 
would accept that mandatory requirements could be used to justify both 
distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures. His main argument in 
favour of this change was legal certainty – the current flexible 
application of the rule was unpredictable.69 The main argument against 
this approach is that the Court would effectively be re-writing the 
Treaty, and that the Member States have – despite numerous Treaty 
amendments – never made use of the possibility to include additional 
justifications in the Treaty.70 This could lead to the conclusion that the 
Member States are actually quite satisfied with the current balance 
between the strict formulation of the rule and the application of the rule 
in practice. Regardless of whether the assimilation of the Treaty 
derogations and mandatory requirements is a good development, the 
focus will now be on the technique that the Court has used to 'keep up 
appearances'.  
In PreussenElektra, Schleswig-Holstein – one of the German Länder – 
had adopted legislation that required energy suppliers in Germany to 
buy a certain percentage of renewable energy that had been produced 
in Germany. As such, the rule made a direct distinction between energy 
produced in Germany and energy produced in other Member States. 
Schleswig-Holstein wanted to justify this rule on the ground of 
environmental protection. However, a classification of the rule as 
distinctly applicable would prevent them from doing so, since 
environmental protection is not a Treaty derogation. For that reason, 
the Court deliberately avoided classifying the measure as distinctly 
                                            
67 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, EU:C:2001:160. 
68 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra (n 
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68), para 229. 
70 Spaventa (n 3). 
24 
 
applicable. All it did was to say that the measure was 'capable, at least 
potentially, of hindering intra-Community trade'.71 The deliberate 
omission to mention the rule's distinct applicability enabled the Court to 
find that the restriction could be justified on the ground of environmental 
protection. However, the Court was well aware that this was a 
somewhat controversial move, and to mitigate its impact the Court also 
stated that environmental protection could in fact be regarded as part of 
the Treaty derogation to protect the health and life of humans, animals 
or plants. Overall, PreussenElektra provides a good example of a case 
where the Court's determination of the availability of a justification 
preceded its analysis of the restriction.  
Although the discussion about the assimilation of justifications has 
been most prominent in the free movement of goods, there have also 
been cases in the other freedoms where the Court has used a similar 
approach. In Kohll,72 a Luxembourg national applied for prior 
authorisation for his daughter to receive orthodontic treatment in 
Germany. Reimbursement of the costs of healthcare services in 
another Member State could only be obtained after prior authorisation 
had been given. Moreover, the procedure for prior authorisation did not 
apply to orthodontic treatment in Luxembourg. On that basis, the 
requirement clearly made a distinction between services received in 
Luxembourg and services received abroad. Despite this distinction, the 
Court stated that 'such rules deter insured persons from approaching 
providers of medical services established in another Member State and 
constitute, for them and their patients, a barrier to freedom to provide 
services'.73 The classification of the restriction as a barrier was 
influenced by the fact that Luxembourg wanted to rely on an objective 
justification – maintaining the financial balance of the social security 
system. This would not have been possible if the rule had been 
classified as directly discriminatory or distinctly applicable. As a result, 
the Court again connected the concepts of restriction and justification to 
enable the Member State to provide a justification and to decide the 
case through the application of the proportionality test. 
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IV. THE CENTRALISATION OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 
1. The Centralisation of Proportionality and the Effet Utile of the Free 
Movement Provisions 
The analysis of the developments in free movement law has shown that 
the Court has used a similar technique in all three developments. 
Firstly, the Court has abandoned its consecutive approach to the 
structure of free movement law. The Court has used an approach 
which has been referred to as 'backwards' reasoning – it has reasoned 
backwards from one of the pillars of the structure of free movement law 
to what used to be a preceding stage of inquiry. Secondly, the Court 
has no longer made a clear distinction between what were previously 
distinct stages of inquiry. The two stages of inquiry have become fused 
or merged to such an extent that they can no longer be regarded as 
separate. The focus of the analysis so far has been on how these 
developments have taken place in free movement law. The next step 
will be to assess why these developments have taken place and what 
their consequences are. The aim will be to look at the motivation for the 
processes of restructuring that have taken place in free movement law, 
and to analyse their effects. Finally, a link will be made between the 
aim and the consequences of the processes of restructuring.  
If the three developments are combined, it becomes clear that there is 
one concept that unites them all. This is the concept of restriction – the 
restriction stage of inquiry plays a central role in each of the 
developments. However, this role is not identical. With market access 
and horizontal direct effect, the Court has reasoned from restriction to 
scope and direct effect. As a result, the concept of restriction has 
become the starting point of the Court's analysis. This has been 
different for the assimilation of express derogations and public interest 
justifications, where the Court has reasoned from justification to 
restriction. As such, the concept of restriction was the destination – not 
the starting point. Nevertheless, the central position of the concept of 
restriction shows why the developments have taken place. The Court's 
main concern has been to protect the effet utile of the free movement 
provisions – to guarantee the effective functioning of the internal 
market. The term effet utile has often been used in a rather abstract 
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way,74 but a structural analysis shows which elements the Court 
considers important to guarantee the effective application of the free 
movement provisions. The impact of measures or actions on the 
exercise of free movement rights becomes crucial. The market access 
approach is based on an analysis of the impact of national rules on the 
ability of companies or individuals to exercise their free movement 
rights. Based on this presumption or finding of impact, cases are 
brought in the scope of free movement law. Similarly, horizontal direct 
effect has developed in such a way that the effect of the actions of 
private parties has become the Court's main yardstick in deciding 
whether private parties should be bound by the free movement 
provisions. In both situations, the impact of measures or conduct has 
encouraged the Court to rethink the structure of free movement law.  
A similar argument cannot be made to explain the assimilation of the 
justifications. The reasoning from justification to restriction does not 
start by looking at the impact of actions. On the contrary, it directly 
affects the assessment of whether there is impact on free movement 
law. The classification of the breach is determined on the basis of the 
justification relied on by the Member State. The assimilation of the 
express derogations and public interest justifications shows that the 
Court considers the internal market – and the free movement 
provisions – as a balancing exercise between economic and non-
economic interests. Keck already confirmed that the Court does not 
regard the internal market as a free market in which the unhindered 
pursuit of economic freedom can be exercised. The internal market is 
supposed to offer equal opportunities, but in offering equal 
opportunities different values – both economic and non-economic – 
should be taken into account. This means that the Court has to balance 
economic rights with social rights,75 and economic rights with 
fundamental human rights.76 The internal market in itself is a construct 
that involves a constant balancing exercise. As a result, it is not 
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problematic for a justification relied on to have a direct impact on the 
Court's classification of the restriction, as long as this justification is 
consistent with the perceived aim of the internal market. As such, the 
aim of the free movement provisions is relied on to redefine the impact 
of measures on the internal market – and, in doing so, to redefine the 
concept of restriction in free movement law. 
Finally, it should be analysed what the result of the restructuring of the 
structure of free movement law is. Each of the three developments 
makes it more likely – if not inevitable – that the outcome of free 
movement cases is determined by the application of the proportionality 
test. The assimilation of the justifications results directly in the 
application of the proportionality test – if the ground of justification is 
accepted and leads to a reclassification of the restriction, the immediate 
next step for the Court is to assess the proportionality of the measure. 
The market access approach and horizontal direct effect do not 
immediately lead to the application of the proportionality test. After all, it 
will first have to be shown that there is a ground of justification. 
However, in combination with the assimilation of the justifications, it is 
likely that the proportionality test will be decisive. As a result, the 
proportionality test has obtained a more prominent role in the structure 
of free movement. It could almost be said that 'all roads lead to 
proportionality'. This centralisation of proportionality shows that the 
Court is confident to rely on the proportionality test to decide free 
movement cases.  
This central role for proportionality can be linked to the aim of the 
processes of restructuring. The increasing significance of 
proportionality shows that the Court believes that the effective 
application of the free movement provisions can best be guaranteed by 
the proportionality test. A direct link is made between the proportionality 
test and the effet utile of free movement law. This is not entirely 
surprising. Two important reasons for the Court's increasing reliance on 
proportionality can be identified. First, the proportionality test involves a 
balancing exercise. It provides a tool through which the various 
interests in a case can be balanced.77 As such, it is consistent and 
compatible with a vision of the internal market as a balancing exercise 
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between economic and non-economic interests.78 This balancing 
exercise can directly be achieved through the application of the 
proportionality test.79 Second, the Court has developed the 
proportionality test in such a way that its application is inherently 
flexible.80 It is flexible in at least two ways. The intensity of review can 
be adapted – in more sensitive areas the Court is more willing to adopt 
a hands-off approach. Second, the Court has been flexible in deciding 
who should conduct the proportionality test – the Court itself or the 
national court. In certain cases, the Court is prepared to leave a broad 
margin of assessment to the national court, while in other cases the 
Court more or less reserves the proportionality test to itself. From this 
perspective, it is not surprising that proportionality has obtained such 
an important role in free movement law.  
2. The Consequences of the Centralisation of Proportionality 
It has been shown how and why proportionality has obtained a central 
position in the structure of free movement law. Two dimensions of this 
process of centralisation will now be analysed – the first is more 
procedural, the second more substantive. They are closely linked to the 
two characteristics of the proportionality test – the balancing exercise 
and its flexible application – that have made the test suitable for a 
central role in free movement law.  
The first dimension that is affected by the centralisation of 
proportionality is the relationship between the Court and national 
courts. If free movement cases are increasingly decided through the 
application of the proportionality test, this has an impact on the role that 
national courts play in deciding free movement cases. There is a real 
risk that centralisation of the proportionality test might similarly result in 
a more central role for the Court. This is, first of all, because it is difficult 
for national courts to assess to what extent the proportionality test is 
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within their own control. It is very difficult to systemise the Court's case 
law in such a way that national courts can say with a certain degree of 
certainty that they are able to conduct the proportionality test 
themselves. Secondly, it is very complicated for national courts to 
decide if the outcome of the proportionality test is sufficiently clear not 
to have to make a preliminary reference to the Court. The outcome of 
the balancing exercise involved in the proportionality test is not easy to 
predict.81 This would be another reason for national courts to make a 
reference to Luxembourg. The result is that the Court obtains a central 
role in deciding free movement cases. Since cases in Luxembourg are 
not exactly dealt with quickly, it is doubtful whether this is helpful for the 
effective application of the free movement provisions. Furthermore, 
because of the inherent flexibility of the application of the proportionality 
test, a more central role for the Court does not help from the 
perspective of the uniform application of free movement law. The 
outcome of the proportionality test is often fact-specific. Therefore, 
cases that are decided through the proportionality test are generally not 
of much assistance to national courts or litigants who might be involved 
in litigation with similar characteristics.   
The second dimension that is affected by the centralisation of 
proportionality is the relationship between the State and its citizens. 
More precisely, it affects the relationship between those who make 
rules that have an impact on the internal market – this could be the 
State or private parties – and those who are affected by these rules. 
The flexible application of the proportionality test leads to a certain 
degree of substantive uncertainty. This uncertainty makes it more 
difficult for parties with regulatory power to decide how to exercise that 
power. Similarly, it becomes more difficult for those who are affected by 
rules to decide whether to challenge them. As such, a central role for 
proportionality also affects legal certainty – not just in the relationship 
between courts, but also in the relationship between rule-makers and 
those affected by the rules. The significant variation in the intensity with 
which national rules or measures are reviewed makes it difficult to 
decide whether rules are proportionality-proof. It puts a significant 
burden on those who defend national rules and those who want to 
attack them to predict with what intensity rules could be reviewed and 
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what the outcome of the review will be.82 Moreover, legal certainty is 
necessary for individuals or companies to have the confidence to 
exercise their free movement rights. Although the proportionality test 
will always be important in free movement law, the other pillars of the 
structure of free movement law create more legal certainty in the 
internal market. 
Overall, the centralisation of proportionality affects both the uniform 
application of the free movement provisions and legal certainty. These 
two concepts are also fundamental to the effet utile of the free 
movement provisions. Although the proportionality test might at first 
appear to be a suitable tool to guarantee the effective application of the 
free movement provisions, too much and too exclusive reliance on 
proportionality is ultimately not in the best interests of the internal 
market.83 For that reason, the Court should not be afraid to rely more 
on the concepts of scope, direct effect and justification to decide free 
movement cases. The advantage of these pillars of the structure is that 
their application is more predictable.  
The centralisation of proportionality has resulted in the neglect of some 
of the other tools in the structure of free movement law. The Court has 
to provide more guidance on which cases fall within the scope of the 
free movement provisions,84 on the question in which situations private 
parties are bound to comply with the free movement provisions, and on 
which justifications are available to justify restrictions on free 
movement. As regards the scope of free movement law, the Court 
should be more precise about the cross-border impact that is required 
for cases to come within the scope of the free movement provisions. 
Clarification is required about the circumstances in which a hypothetical 
impact on free movement is sufficient. For horizontal direct effect, the 
Court should provide more substance to the concepts of collective 
regulation and legal autonomy laid down in Walrave and Koch. Private 
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parties have to know in which circumstances or under what conditions 
they are expected to comply with the free movement provisions. The 
Court has not provided the required clarification in cases like Viking, 
Laval and Fra.bo. Finally, the Court should provide a list of mandatory 
requirements that can be used to justify distinctly applicable or directly 
discriminatory restrictions. If the assimilation of justifications was only 
necessary to provide a more prominent role to environmental protection 
– which is often considered the 'special one' among mandatory 
requirements – the Court should explicitly acknowledge this. To 
conclude, the Court has to give more guidance on the application of the 
pillars of the structure. Such guidance cannot be developed if cases are 
predominantly decided by relying on the proportionality test.  
In the end, a more developed and precise approach to the scope of 
free movement, to direct effect and to the justifications will improve 
legal certainty in the internal market. If these concepts are developed 
more precisely and coherently, this will increase the confidence of 
national courts in applying them. Furthermore, it will provide more legal 
certainty to public and private parties that are exercising regulatory 
power in the internal market. In combination with the proportionality 
test, this structure of free movement law provides a solid foundation 
that is able to guarantee the effective functioning of the internal market. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Market access, horizontal direct effect and the assimilation of 
justifications – three phenomena that have dominated discussions 
about free movement law in the last decades. This article has not 
attempted to provide revolutionary new definitions or interpretations of 
these developments. Rather, it has sought to combine them by 
choosing the perspective of the structure of free movement law. This 
perspective shows that the three developments are connected and 
have had the same consequences. The analysis has resulted in three 
main conclusions.  
Firstly, the Court has used the same technique in market access, 
horizontal direct effect and assimilation of the justifications cases. This 
technique is based on 'backwards' reasoning from one pillar of the 
structure to what used to be a preceding pillar of the structure. The 
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consecutive order of the structure of free movement law has been 
abandoned. Moreover, what used to be two separate stages of inquiry 
are no longer regarded as separate. They have become merged in 
such a way that it has become difficult to distinguish between them.  
Secondly, for all three developments, the concept of restriction is either 
the 'starting point' or the 'destination' of the Court's reasoning. As a 
result, it is clear that the Court is concerned with guaranteeing the 
effective application of the free movement provisions. In order to do 
this, it is necessary to keep the aim of the free movement provisions in 
mind. They represent a balancing exercise between economic and non-
economic interests. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
proportionality test has become the Court's favourite tool to decide free 
movement cases.  
Thirdly, the centralisation of proportionality in the internal market has 
important consequences. It affects the relationship between the Court 
and national courts, and it also affects the relationship between the 
State and its citizens. Although it is understandable that the flexibility of 
the proportionality test makes it a suitable tool to decide free movement 
cases, the uniform application of the free movement provisions and 
legal certainty are not necessarily improved by a central role for 
proportionality. As a consequence, the Court should be encouraged to 
not only rely on the proportionality test to decide free movement cases, 
but also to use other concepts in the structure of free movement law. 
This is not criticism of the proportionality test as such, but rather of the 
role that proportionality has been given. The centralised role of 
proportionality in free movement law should be reconsidered. 
